2d, that sufficient means for transporting the army could be provided;

3d, " that a naval auxiliary force " could " be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York River "; and

4th, ' that the force to be left to cover Washington be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace."

Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell fixed this force at a full garrison for the forts on the right or western bank of the Potomac, with troops sufficient to occupy those on the left or eastern bank, and an additional covering force of 25,000 men " in front of the Virginia line"; while Sumner estimated that "a total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice."[1]

General McClellan assented at once to the decision of the council; and the Secretary of War, the same day, notified him that the President would make no objection to the " plan agreed upon " by him and the corps-commanders, adding however, directions to leave a sufficient force at Manassas Junction, and to " leave Washington entirely secure."

In compliance with the former direction, which good authorities[2] have criticised as involving an unnecessary diminution of the active army, McClellan sent a force to the Junction and gave orders for the erection of defensive works there. His

own intention was to open the Manassas Gap railroad to the Shenandoah Valley,[8] and the order of the President to sta*

[1] 5 W. R., 55, 56.
[2] Swinton, 95.
[3] Williams to Banks, 5 W. R,, 56.